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I would say by about the mid-80s, the avant-garde was viewed as a virus eating away at
the body politic—something that needed to be stamped out if possible. Artists should
be—if not killed—at least silenced.
Martha Wilson (founder and artistic director of Franklin Furnace)1
During the culture wars in the United States from the late 1980s into the 1990s, surveillance
of representations of the American citizen reached a particular frenzy. In her powerful
metaphor, Martha Wilson, founder of the arts organisation Franklin Furnace, refers to the
proliferating panic of conservative commentators about avant-garde artists challenging the
heteronormative status quo.2 This article explores the moral panic that has accompanied
attempts by the New Right to shape and define the American citizen as heterosexual,
monogamous, white and a believer in middle-class family values. Decisions about govern-
ment funding for the arts have been made with the aim of policing and regulating the
work of artists, particularly those who critiqued traditional American values. My focus here
is the work of performance artists Karen Finley and Holly Hughes, and the conditions that
led to controversy around their performances. Finley and Hughes created performances that
challenged hegemonic discourses of gender and sexuality. They were two of those artists
branded by the media as the ‘NEA Four’, practitioners whose work was considered indecent
and consequently de-funded by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)—the main
government funding body for artists in the United States.3 During the moral panic associated
with the ‘NEA Four’, national debates about freedom of speech, censorship and the legislative
control of arts funding rapidly polarised. Discourses about the regulation and prohibition
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of gendered and sexual representation actually proliferated discourses about sex and gender,
escalating the panic.
This article draws on the work of Judith Butler to understand the role of critique in undoing
the oppressive effects of ‘restrictively normative conceptions of sexual and gendered life’.4
Isolating incoherence, unspeakability and vulnerability in social life as the conditions in
which critique may emerge, Butler draws attention to the precariousness of this act. If the
act of critique questions normative and regulatory practices in order to imagine a different
socio-political future, and if critique is likely to emerge out of a clash between discourses,
then this fragile socio-political environment is also susceptible to other kinds of discursive
intervention, such as the workings of a moral panic. The term ‘moral panic’ was first used
in 1971 by sociologist Jock Young about the socio-cultural meanings of drug taking, and was
later more fully developed by Stanley Cohen in his study of mods and rockers. Since the
inception of the term, academics have contested the characteristics of moral panic, and inter-
rogated those processes and sequences by which they unfold.5 The expansion of the media
and new technologies register, in ever more complex ways, such events as they take place
and to meet this culture of immediacy theories of moral panic have been revamped, recon-
ceived and rearticulated.6
My argument that follows imagines performance art as a queer time and space; that is, not
only does performance art contest normative structures of traditional theatrical performance,
so too does it challenge understandings of normative subjects, and the relation of the arts to
structures of power. Judith Halberstam’s scholarship about queer time and space has been a
significant development in queer studies and is critical to the formulation of my theorising
of performance art.7 Like David Román and Richard Meyer, I share the conviction that 
‘ “queerness” becomes most useful as an interpretive category, when placed in relation to
particular social contexts, historical moments, and cultural surrounds’.8 This is not to say
that performance art is an exclusively queer art form, but rather to acknowledge that it has
been easily accessible to historically marginalised groups such as feminists and queers because
practitioners often employed the body and skills of a solo performer, using material from
everyday life with a focus on the body in time and space and often turning toward auto-
biographical explorations.9 Therefore, performance art of this kind is often less expensive to
produce than more traditional theatre, and involves self-devised work in which some
performers draw on personal experience to offer socio-political and cultural critique of
pressing issues.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the emergence of queer theory—which understands
identities as not fixed or stable, but fluid, dynamic, contradictory and constructed—some
marginalised performance artists chose this medium through which to challenge the
normalisation and institutionalisation of heterosexuality. Halberstam suggests that queer
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time emerges outside the temporal frame of ‘bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity,
risk/safety, and inheritance’ while queer space refers to the place-making practices in which
queer identities engage, as well as new spaces constructed by queer counterpublics.10
Counterpublics are ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups
invent and circulate counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their
identities, interests and needs’.11 There is no doubt that the American New Right was
concerned about the potential development and perceived government-sponsored support
of counterpublics around queer subjectivity. The de-funding of Finley and Hughes suggests
a concern that the emergence of such counterpublics would result in further acknowl-
edgement of and debate into the rights of citizens occupying alternative sexual and gendered
subjectivities.
Sexual citizenship and moral panic: a historical overview
The set of circumstances around NEA v. Finley may also be used as a pivot to consider the
role of the performing arts in reconstituting the zone of citizenship, especially sexual
citizenship.12 In his critique of a selection of alternative and mainstream performances
mounted between 1994 and 2004 across the United States, David Román situates per-
formance at the centre of ‘current national enquiries and debates’ and as vital to shaping the
national imaginary.13 Challenging hegemonic discourses that position the performing arts
as marginal to national concerns, Román argues that some contemporary performance
positions audiences as critical subjects, and by so doing provides a framework to rehearse
new forms of sociality.14 Governmental fears inspired by the New Right’s activism around
this kind of socio-political engagement may be related to the perceived influence that such
performances have on individual and group values, beliefs and practices. These practices
may include engaging in further activism for increasing rights for marginalised gendered and
sexual subjects. Jill Dolan argues that theatre and ‘performance help shape and promote
certain understandings of who “we” are, of what an American looks like and believes in’.15
Heightened sexual conservatism therefore works in tandem with governmental and legal
regulation during times of moral panic to reduce the subjective and representational possi-
bilities of sexual citizenship. An example of institutional and governmental response to panic
around same-sex recognition is the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) signed off by Bill Clinton
on 21 September 1996, which demonstrates that laws intent on ‘protecting’ marriage have
‘no compelling state interest except to save the state money by excluding queer citizens from
state protections and benefits’.16 Further, these kinds of regulations and restrictions amplify
and proliferate discourses of homosexuality and the subsequent panic that government, legal
and socio-cultural bodies wish to contain.
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In the 1998 United States Supreme Court case NEA v. Finley, the court decided that it was
constitutional for the NEA, an independent federal agency supporting artists and arts organ-
isations, to consider ‘general standards of decency’ in awarding grants to applicants.17 In
response to heightened moral panic about artists challenging normative understandings of
gendered and sexual identities, and of the representation of religious iconography in art, the
United States Congress inserted the ‘decency’ clause into the NEA’s 1990 reauthorisation bill,
and John Frohnmayer, former NEA chairperson, implemented that congressional change.18
The decency clause was to become part of the funding criteria employed by the NEA in
making grant decisions. This meant that applicants for funding were agreeing to accept
the ‘decency’ clause as binding, which had a chilling effect on would-be applicants, particu-
larly those artists whose work challenged normative boundaries.19 Having applied to the
NEA for individual grants before the implementation of the ‘decency’ clause, performance
artists Karen Finley, Holly Hughes, John Fleck and Tim Miller had initially been supported
by an NEA review panel, but after implementation the NEA retroactively de-funded their
applications. This act of cultural brokerage was the result of a moral panic manufactured
around non-normative representations of gender and sexuality.
The Finley case exemplifies Kenneth Thompson’s insight that ‘events are more likely to
be perceived as fundamental threats and to give rise to moral panic if the society, or some
part of it, is already in crisis or experiencing disturbing changes giving rise to stress’.20
One of these crises was the emergence of HIV/AIDS and the subsequent homophobic 
scare campaigns manufactured by the New Right and homophobic conservative religious
groups. Another crisis was the ongoing campaigning against same-sex marriage resulting in
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as mentioned above. NEA v. Finley is only one 
narrative from the culture wars, but it is a complex and powerful one—shaped by the 
hostility, volatility and disproportionality that we may understand as the workings of 
moral panic.
In her now famous essay, ‘Thinking Sex’, Gayle Rubin argues that disputes ‘over sexual
behaviour often become the vehicles for displacing social anxieties, and discharging their
attendant emotional intensity’.21 In matters of panic around sex, the New Right deploys
identity categories such as ‘lesbian’ and ‘gay’ as markers of social deviance, not just to play
into the apparent binary of homosexual–heterosexual relations, but also to indicate the
proximity of the homosexual to other ‘folk devils’.22 Identifying other periods of unrest,
Rubin reminds her reader of the cyclical nature of moral panics around sex—referring to the
Comstock Act, passed as the first American federal anti-obscenity legislation in 1873.23 This
act banned making, selling, advertising, possessing, posting or importing books and images
considered obscene. By run-on effect contraceptive and abortive drugs and associated
information and devices were banned, and ‘most states passed their own anti-obscenity laws’
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to mirror that Federal benchmark.24 Rubin also identifies the 1950s as a time in which
sexuality was institutionally and discursively reorganised when the Comstock law was
challenged and focus shifted to prostitution, masturbation, the figure of the ‘sex offender’,
and—significantly—the ‘homosexual menace’ (a phenomenon linked to matters of national
security through the discourse of communism and its attendant witch hunts).25 While
Comstock had initiated a ‘process of nationalizing the discipline of sexual representation
in the United States in the name of protecting national culture’, the homosexual conspirator
became a symbol for anti-nationalism in the hands of Senator Joseph McCarthy.26 Playing
into prevalent anxieties about sexuality and strategically linking the ‘lavender menace’
with the ‘red menace’, McCarthy told reporters: ‘If you want to be against McCarthy, boys,
you’ve got to be either a Communist or a cocksucker.’27 The implication was that both were
national and sexual traitors, neither conforming to the nation’s idea of an appropriately
masculine or feminine citizen subject.
There are also many contemporary examples of the regulation of sexuality. These include
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), in which the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a Georgia sodomy law that criminalised oral and anal sex in private between consenting
adults; Kentucky v. Wasson (1992), a Supreme Court decision striking down Kentucky’s crim-
inalisation of consensual sodomy; and, some seventeen years later, Lawrence v. Texas (2003),
which overruled state law in Texas, the decision in Bowers, and twelve other states, with
the majority arguing that intimate consensual sexual conduct is protected by substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment (which includes the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses).28
Sodomy laws have also been applied unevenly, primarily targeting sex between men.29 In
his dissent against the majority in Bowers, Justice Blackmun comments that, notably, ‘the
Court makes no offer to explain why it has chosen to group private, consensual homosexual
activity with adultery and incest rather than with private, consensual heterosexual activity
by unmarried persons, or indeed, with oral or anal sex within marriage’.30 Drawing attention
to the collapse of homosexual activity with other categories of deviance, Justice Blackmun
attends to the rhetorical slippages that take place during a moral panic. Thomas Kendall
comments that the court’s ‘rhetorical contortions in Hardwick reveal the desperate lengths 
to which the paranoid judicial imagination is willing, at least figurally, to go to defend
itself from a constitutional claim which “gnaws at the roots of [the] male heterosexual
identity” that subtends the Court’s institutional self-image’.31 Kendall’s excellent discussion
acknowledges the court’s act-based and identity-based conceptions of sodomy which remains
inattentive to this distinction as more apparent than real.32 In her discussion of citizen-
ship, Lauren Berlant notes the circulation of a memo to the Supreme Court justices during
Bowers. The memo was written by Justice Thurgood Marshall’s clerk, Daniel Richman, and
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situated sodomy as a sexual rather than a homosexual act: ‘THIS IS NOT ONLY A CASE
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALS. ALL SORTS OF PEOPLE DO THIS KIND OF THING.’33 Berlant
suggests that Richman’s reference to heterosexuality almost brought ‘the “sex” of hetero-
sexuality’ into view, so that it was ‘imaginable, corporeal, visible, public’—instead of ‘that
sacred national identity that happens in the neutral territory of national culture’.34 That
heterosexuals engage in the same or similar sexual practices to homosexuals was far too queer
for the Supreme Court to publicly recognise. Such recognition would have infringed upon
the ‘zone of privacy’—a term coined by Justice William O. Douglas’s 1965 opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut prohibiting the courts from peering into the marital bedrooms of heterosexuals;
so too would it have disturbed the fiction of national heterosexuality.35
This particular fiction is still compulsory within the Uniform Code of Military Justice in
which sodomy is illegal for members of the United States armed forces—a group of citizens
whose role is explicitly understood to both represent and embody the nation and, thus,
heteronormativity. In official histories, the armed forces occupy a position in perhaps the
largest of American closets, a place in which the assumed heterosexuality of members and
their capacity for reproduction is strategically pitted against the possibility of imminent death.
Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner suggest that national ‘heterosexuality is the mechanism
by which a core national culture can be imagined as a sanitized space of sentimental feeling
and immaculate behaviour, a space of pure citizenship’.36 Performances of gender are care-
fully regulated, speech and conduct are collapsed, and self-definition as queer is prohibited
in the ‘discharge’ policy. Butler suggests that the ‘specific performativity attributed to homo-
sexual utterance is not simply that the utterance performs the sexuality of which it speaks,
but that it transmits sexuality through speech: the utterance is figured as a site of contagion’
and that ‘the speaking of prohibited names becomes the occasion for an uncontrollable
communication’.37 Similarly, the circulation and proliferation of moral panic relies on the
continual repetition on the part of special interest groups and media of a subject or event
that is perceived to be prohibited or taboo so as to create social and political instability.
Central to Butler’s thesis is the ‘question of whether citizenship requires the repression of
homosexuality’ and the fact that ‘the military is already a zone of partial citizenship, a domain
in which selected features of citizenship are preserved, and others are suspended’.38 Similarly,
same sex couples have partial citizenship, encountering difficulties with federally sanctioned
marriage, joint health care, fertility and adoption rights, tax breaks, superannuation and
inheritance. This example demonstrates that the United States military’s stance on sexual
minorities shows that the state has a powerful role not only in pathologising identities, but
also in shaping them. So too does the NEA have a powerful role in legitimating and supporting
the representation of hegemonic groups over minorities, and in structuring and constituting
the national imagination.
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The culture wars
The ‘culture wars’, as played out in the United States during the late 1980s and into the
1990s, may be viewed as a sustained period of moral panic. If the increased rapidity and all-
pervasive quality of moral panics defines the present era—as Kenneth Thompson suggests—
then the culture wars may be characterised by a series of moral panics, manufactured by
special interest groups and the media, about the representation of alternative understandings
of issues from gender and sexuality to ethnicity and religion. Within an American context,
the ‘culture wars’—a phrase first employed by sociologist James Hunter as the title of his
1991 monograph—is most often used to refer to a series of sustained ideological conflicts
broadly relating to the representation of diversity and difference in American culture.39 The
culture wars in the 1980s and 1990s extend and elaborate upon issues raised by some of the
socio-political movements in the 1960s and 1970s, including civil rights, women’s liberation
and gay and lesbian liberation movements. Art produced during this time also responded to
the HIV/AIDS pandemic that was first recognised by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, an agency of the US Department of Health and Human Services, on 5 June 1981.
Initially known as GRID (gay-related immunodeficiency disease), the HIV/AIDS pandemic
had originally been associated with gay men, and had been used as ammunition by the New
Right and conservative religious groups to advance a homophobic agenda.40 For example,
Richard Meyer gives an account of conservative writer William F. Buckley’s call in the New
York Times for mandatory tattooing of those with HIV/AIDS, to act as a warning to others—
a call clearly meant to evoke the Nazi inscription of Jews (and other racial minorities) and
homosexuals during the Holocaust.41 Emphasising the language of moral pollution and
degeneracy, Vance makes a similar observation about the rhetoric mobilised within the
culture wars in an ‘analogy chillingly reminiscent of Nazi cultural metaphors’.42 Vance high-
lights the rhetoric of politician and syndicated columnist Patrick Buchanan to make her
point. Buchanan proclaims: ‘As with our rivers and lakes, we need to clean up our culture:
for it is a well from which we must all drink. Just as a poisoned land will yield up poisonous
fruits, so a polluted culture, left to fester and stink, can destroy a nation’s soul.’43 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, this same rhetoric emerges in the Supreme Court transcripts in NEA v. Finley.44
In his ‘Declaration of Independence to Congress’, performance artist Tim Miller suggests
that George Bush Sr ‘has conspired to make gay artists, artists of color, feminist artists, artists
who are dealing with AIDS, anyone who speaks their mind in an outraged and clear voice,
to be considered unsuitable for the cultural support that any democracy should provide’.45
Miller gestures to many of the issues considered controversial within the context of the culture
wars: government funding for the arts, government support of the representation of minority
voices in the arts, the responsibility of democracies to make available cultural support for
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a diversity of its citizens, and the affective power of the arts to generate and participate in
cultural debate. Douglas Crimp comments that ‘the Reagan/Bush administrations under-
stood exactly the power of art to stir radical participation in democracy’ and that ‘the admin-
istrations purposefully set about to dismantle the endowments to clamp down on avenues
for public dissent’.46 Threats to dismantle the endowment instigated by the New Right in
response to supposedly ‘controversial’ art and performances, regulations such as the decency
clause, and the elimination of individual grants for visual and performance artists, goes
against the spirit of the congressional mandate establishing the NEA in 1965. This mandate
declared the government’s help was necessary to ‘create and sustain not only a climate of
encouraging thought, imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating
the release of this creative talent’.47 Vance suggests that the chain of events that led to a ‘full-
fledged moral panic’, ‘was new to the arts community’, but ‘is in fact, a staple of contemporary
right wing politics’.48
Referring to artists funded during this time, Philip Brookman, then curator at the
Washington Project for the Arts—a non profit experimental art gallery in the nation’s capital—
comments that ‘these artists, who had received NEA funding, directly or indirectly, had struck
a raw nerve with Congress and in some segments of the public. Federal money, it was thought,
should not support the creation and exhibition of ideas that questioned the status quo’.49
However, Congress formed the NEA, composed of professionals working in the arts, to base
funding on artistic merit and decreed that the NEA’s future direction was to be informed
by ‘broadly conceived national policy’ rather than to be controlled by politicians who may
be driven by political concerns.50 Congress’s intent was to have government ‘assistance, but
not intervention … support but not control … stimulation but not participation’.51 Offering
poignant, controversial and timely critiques of American culture, work produced by artists
such as those discussed above staged a set of anxieties about what it was to be American, and
what it meant for some citizens to challenge traditional values by performing their America
in an era of moral panic. The response from the religious right—most of whom never viewed
the targeted performances—echoes Thompson’s point that the fear of sexual immorality and
its impact on the family, as the main stronghold of social order, is part of a perspective that
looks back ‘to a golden age of moral certainties from which there has only been moral
decline’.52 Hearsay and inaccurate descriptions about these performances circulated through
discourses of popular culture and became political fodder for religious groups and the New
Right, directly informing the work of a professional government agency. Nikolas Rose suggests
that practices of ‘government are deliberate attempts to shape conduct in certain ways in
relation to certain objectives’ and that ‘attempts at governing may be formally rationalized
in programming statements, policy documents, pamphlets and speeches’.53 The adoption of
the decency clause by the NEA acted as a mechanism through which the individual conduct
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of artists was governed by the interests and concerns of the nation. The administrative
processes of George Bush Sr worked to construct the nation as a heteronormative state,
actively shaping the moral order of its citizens by compelling artists to recreate the hegemonic
beliefs, values and practices that it endorsed.
Immediately prior to the de-funding of Finley, Fleck, Hughes and Miller, the culture wars
had been characterised by a moral panic manufactured by right-wing lobby groups about
work produced by two photographic artists, Andreas Serrano and Robert Mapplethorpe.
Serrano’s work, Piss Christ, was a photograph depicting a crucifix in a jar of the artist’s urine,
challenging normative representations about the role of iconography in religion.54 Robert
Mapplethorpe’s retrospective, ‘The Perfect Moment’, included a few works depicting
homoerotic and sadomasochistic themes.55 Reverend Donald Wildmon, of the American
Family Association, denounced works produced by both artists, sending pictures of the
works to those on his large mailing list.56 Reverend Pat Robertson also positioned himself 
as moral entrepreneur, distributing letters in red envelopes cataloguing descriptions of 
nine photos (eight of which were Mapplethorpe’s, while one was invented purely to provoke)
to his constituents and supporters one week after having founded the Christian Coalition.57
Reverend Robertson effectively recreated and packaged the scapegoat or folk devil necessary
for a moral panic about homosexuality, representation and public funding, on which some
members of the public could project their fears and fantasies.58 The invention of ‘image
number seven’ plays into stereotypical discourses that position gay men as paedophiles,
fueling the moral panic about homosexuality and its representation in public art. Com-
menting on the effectiveness of the moral panic generated by the new and religious right,
Vance argues that while earlier efforts to alter the direction of the NEA were institutionally
and bureaucratically directed, ‘the NEA controversy marks the first time that this emotion
has been tapped in mass political action’.59
As a result of controversy manufactured around these art works, there was a public outcry
from the religious right, who called for the abolition of the NEA.60 Protests led to congressional
debate, which saw a compromise measure reached known as the ‘Helms amendment’ after
anti-NEA North Carolina senator, Jesse Helms. This marked the first time that Congress had
placed content restrictions on NEA grants, as the amendment provided that funds could not
be ‘used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials in which the judgment of the [NEA]
… may be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism,
homoeroticism, [and] the exploitation of children’.61 Helms’s catalogue of ‘obscene acts’
collapses consensual with non-consensual acts, and legal with illegal acts. It is as if one act
leads unproblematically to the next, as he slides into familiar discourses in which repre-
sentation of sexual minorities equates with the promotion of those sexual practices and
identities, and the dissemination of disease. Helms invokes a then potent fear of HIV/AIDS,
91CRISTYN DAVIES—PROLIFERATING PANIC
blaming the pandemic on queer bodies.62 Helms and his colleagues used images by Serrano
and Mapplethorpe as an opportunity to further the New Right’s political agenda, which
included limiting the rights of queer sexual citizens. In Bella Lewitzsky v. Frohnmayer, a district
court declared unconstitutional this first content-based restriction imposed on the agency.63
Congress appointed an independent commission to review the agency’s grant process, and
in September 1990 the commission’s report advised that while the government was not con-
stitutionally obliged to fund art, its action in de-funding artists by legislation imposing con-
tent-based restrictions ought to be strongly discouraged.64
Despite the commission’s findings, the NEA implemented the amendment colloquially
known as the ‘decency’ clause in December 1990. This clause required the NEA chairperson
to guarantee that ‘artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public’.65 Although this clause appears to be relatively
benign, reading the decency clause in the context of the ‘Helms amendment’ shows that,
although vague, the construction of decency in this discursive moment really meant ‘not
queer’.66 As Richard Meyer puts it, ‘the regulation of art is most effective where it is least
visible … censorship is enabled, rather than disabled, by amorphous concepts such as “general
standards of decency” ’.67 Much of the moral panic that perpetuated the culture wars depended
on an evacuation of specificity (such as the replacement of the Helms amendment with the
‘decency’ clause) wherein the language of generality widened the scope for new folk devils
to emerge. It is within this environment that Karen Finley and Holly Hughes became poster
girls for indecency.
Challenging the heteronormative American citizen: Karen Finley and 
Holly Hughes
Finley, Hughes, Fleck and Miller applied to the theatre program of the NEA in 1990 to fund
their individual projects before the ‘decency’ clause was enacted. Diverse panels that reviewed
funding applications at the NEA recommended that the projects receive funding, but in
response to increasing controversy, politicisation, and moral panic surrounding the NEA,
chairperson John Frohnmayer subsequently overrode this approval.68 This particular case
exemplifies Cohen’s suggestion that the media is an important carrier and producer of moral
panics and that reports about potentially controversial events are most frequently produced
in a ‘stylized and stereotypical fashion’.69 On 11 May 1990, prior to the public announcement
of the NEA’s successful grant recipients and their projects, syndicated columnists Rowland
Evans and Robert Novak of the Washington Post publicly drew attention to the precarious
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position of John Frohnmayer as well as dismissing the work of Karen Finley and artists with
similar projects:
Only a few exhibits up for approval inhabit the shadowy realm of controversy about true
artistic merit. NEA chairman John Frohnmayer has been advised to veto them, including
the performance of a nude, chocolate smeared woman in what an NEA memorandum
calls a ‘solo theater piece’ and what the artist herself, Karen Finley, describes as ‘triggering
emotional and taboo events.’ An administration insider calls the exhibit ‘outrageous’ … 
A veto would ease President Bush’s deepening troubles with conservatives on his suspect
cultural agenda. The Mapplethorpe photographic exhibit funded by the NEA last year has
generated more angry mail than the abortion issue … The Finley exhibit, praised by 
some but damned by others in terms of its artistic value, could become the Mapplethorpe
case of 1990.70
Karen Finley’s work positions her as social activist and provocateur. Mel Gussow suggests
that Finley, ‘[s]pecializing in self exposure, both physical and emotional’, ‘places herself on
the firing line and dares her audience to be offended’.71 Evans and Novak’s description of
Karen Finley’s performance piece, ‘We Keep Our Victims Ready’, decontextualises Finley’s
critique of, and intervention, into the position of women, sexual violence and homo-
phobia in American society.72 Evans and Novak also use the familiar strategy of devaluing
the artist’s merit and, therefore, the aesthetic value of the work. This discourse, used by
the New Right around representation, excludes work from that area of ‘free’ expression
designated as art: objectionable work ceases to have protected status.73 Writing about the
value of art as a medium to provoke, disturb and unsettle our cultural values, Butler argues
that ‘the value of being disturbed is no longer a value in itself ’, but rather has become an
arena through which politicians believe that ‘there is a line of acceptability and that they
ought to demarcate what is and is not disturbing’.74 She suggests that ‘de-funding is a way
to drain the debate of its institutional basis, and to defy the precept that the institution’s
cultural work consists precisely in such moments of social disarticulation’.75 Indeed, these
are the moments through which we might understand the public as fractured, or as coming
together in ways that are disturbing, predictable or groundbreaking and through which
dialogue, debate and thought-provoking critiques can emerge.
Utilising the notion of queer space and time, there are various ways in which Finley’s work
provokes different readings disrupting heteronormativity. First, the medium of performance
encourages an audience to temporarily suspend disbelief in relation to time and space to
enter the world of the performance artist. Second, Finley challenges and reconceptualises
the ways in which women are expected to inhabit and take up space, providing counter-
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discourses and a context through which counterpublics may emerge. In addition, she perverts
and disrupts understandings of time as conceived for the normative heterosexual subject.
This includes the constitution of gendered and sexual subjects in relation to marriage, repro-
duction and nuclear family life.
Finley employs performance art to critique the 1987 Tawana Brawley case in which a 16-
year-old African American woman was found dazed and semi-conscious in a trash bag
covered in human excrement. When found, the young woman claimed to have been raped
by white police officers. The case gained media attention and the investigation and trial were
highly publicised. Throughout the case, Brawley was accused of faking the incident. In her
performance, Finley ‘decided to create a performance out of the chaos’, repositioning the
intersection between the politics of ethnicity, representations of truth, and sexual violence
against women.76 What Finley’s performance work does is to disrupt familiar frames of
reference such as motherhood, heterosexual relationships and reproduction, and nuclear
family values to queer the literal space and time of an event by employing the symbolic to
disrupt customary frames of reference. In this instance, Finley disrupts black–white relations
from her privileged position as a white woman so as to challenge white male power over
black women, and all women.
Putting forward a methodology through which we may read critical moments in culture,
Butler argues that we should attend to the work that artists produce to call into question our
values, beliefs and practices, and that these moments are often disturbing and disorienting
because we do not know how to locate ourselves, and that our construction of knowledge
and our values are challenged.77 In order to encourage her audience to think and act
otherwise, Finley draws on a feminist tradition of performance art in which the body is fore-
grounded as the site through which cultural and socio-political values are inscribed. Finley’s
acts are confronting because she intervenes in hegemonic inscriptions of the female body,
often using food materials that are themselves ‘ambiguous, liminal, occupying an intermediate
zone between the solid and liquid’.78 Lynda Hart argues that ‘having already been well-
established as a performer whose work involves the manipulation of bodily fluids as well as
anal eroticism, Finley undoubtedly elicited AIDS hysteria as well’.79 Hart diligently maps the
ways in which feminist artist Finley is read through discourses of homophobia because a
woman who is perceived as aggressive carries with her the mark of the lesbian, pointing out
that the NEA controversies were explicitly concerned to police displays of the body.80 In this
way, Finley’s performances queer time and space by interrupting and resignifying symbols,
gestures and behaviours historically associated with queer subjects. She chooses to use
chocolate because of its associations with love, thus creating a counter-discourse to the ways
in which she perceives that ‘women are usually treated like shit’.81 Her performance also
contests the representation of Brawley as a liar who invented a set of circumstances, and
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instead attends to the complex and disturbing history of racially motivated gendered and
sexual violence in America.
While Finley’s acts are perceived to be offensive because she uses her body to deconstruct
the patriarchy and socio-political constructions of gendered and queer bodies, it is
unsurprising that in the oral transcripts for NEA v. Finley, the queer body is almost com-
pletely erased. There is little mention of the representation of homosexuality, homoeroticism
or feminism in the transcripts by the Supreme Court justices. Instead, Justice Breyer offers
the following hypothetical:
Now, is it the case … and I’m only asking these questions to get your response, say, if in fact
the NEA wants to give a grant for somebody to produce something that’s public work, and
suppose what they do is a white supremacist group, and they want to have racial epithets
all over the picture, and the NEA says we think that’s an inappropriate use of this money, in
your opinion is that—and we can imagine the most—imagine the most horrible ones you
can possibly think of, all right, and they say, the person gets up there and he says, I’m a
member of the Klu Klux Klan, or whatever, and this is my point of view, and is it your
view that the Constitution requires the NEA to fund that, that particular applicant?82
With this comparison, Justice Breyer suggests that representations of alternative narratives
about gender and sexuality are in effect doing the same kind of violence to an audience as
that of a work that expresses racial supremacist ideologies. In order to avoid discussion of
homosexuality, the court poses a hypothetical in which the semantic meaning is in excess of
the original referent. The Supreme Court literally erases discussion of homosexuality—
this unspeakability performs the very erasure in representation the court seeks to secure in
art subsidised by the government. The hypothetical narrative suggested by Justice Breyer
is purposefully kept vague—not only is Nazism implied as previously pointed out, but
also slavery. The vagueness of this example erases the particularity of each history of racism
and violence. There is an interesting substitution here wherein the Supreme Court justices
animate the trope of race—that other marker of difference—in order to simultaneously
silence, and to ‘speak’ implicitly about, representations of gender and sexuality. Butler suggests
that ‘racially marked depictions of sexuality will be most susceptible to prosecution, and
those representations that threaten the pieties and purities of race and sexuality will become
most vulnerable’.83 Evacuating the specificity and particularity that good critique requires
is a strategic move for the court to escalate moral panic around gender and sexuality implicitly,
so as to be seen to be contending with the matter at hand. The Supreme Court uses a
hystericising and ultimately false analogy de-historicising images of racial violence in the
name of protecting American citizens.
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Although the US Supreme Court is positioned to be the arbitrator of an explosive cultural
debate, it too is situated firmly within the moral panic not only of the culture wars, but also
within the discursive battle around President Clinton’s impeachment over the Lewinsky
scandal. This episode in American history might also be considered to have queered time
and space by its transgression of heterosexual moral boundaries. Further, the nature of the
activity carried out by the president in the White House, both perceived to be bastions of
American citizenship by the American people, was constituted by the president as not really
sex after all. Thus, the Supreme Court in Finley was making a decision about representations
of gender and sexuality at a time when the president had contravened sexual boundaries;
American values, decency and respect were under contestation at the highest level of
government. This contestation and ambiguity around cultural values concerned with sexuality
is played out by Justice Breyer, who abandons critical analysis, relying instead on an instinct
infused with a discourse of morality:
I don’t know what the word decency means. It—there’s certainly a sense of decency, a 
sense of it, in which no work of art that is good could be indecent. It’s very hard for me to
think, if I think of that sense, that a great work of art is also an indecent work. I can’t
think of one.84
Equating decency with valuable artistic work, this rhetoric collapses discourses of morality
with discourses of cultural value, which is precisely the way in which the ‘decency’ clause
was to work. Arguing that in Miller v. California the notion of ‘appealing to prurience’ is
counterposed to the notion of ‘literary, artistic, political, or scientific value’, Butler locates
the rationale ‘taken up by Jesse Helms and others to argue that the National Endowment for
the Arts is under no obligation to fund obscene materials’ in order to dismiss the work of
queer artists as obscene and lacking in literary value.85 The decision by the Supreme Court
justices to uphold the constitutionality of the ‘decency clause’ in NEA v. Finley suggests
performance art offers a critique that needs to be contained.
Another applicant who was also de-funded, Holly Hughes, chose to write a perform-
ance piece about her experience of the Supreme Court case surrounding the moral panic.
Offering an analysis of the language and rhetoric used in the case in her performance, Preaching
to the Perverted, Hughes narrates one of the key arguments offered by her lawyer—that
‘vagueness and impermissibly viewpoint based’ regulations adopted by the NEA contravene
the first amendment.86 Hughes’s substitution of ‘perverted’ for ‘converted’ sets up her narrative,
a retelling of her de-funding by the NEA and its attendant misreading and misrepresentation
of her performance work. Employing satire, Hughes critiques the prurient interest in her
homosexuality by right-wing politicians and organisations, and their refusal to recognise her
professional identity as a performance artist. Hughes explains that though the federal
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government does not have to fund the arts, viewpoint discrimination is illegal. Hughes then
maps the usage of the word ‘lesbian’, reading that usage alongside viewpoint:
But this whole episode began, nearly ten years ago,/with a one sentence description of our
work before the National Council on the Arts:/‘Holly Hughes is a lesbian and her work is
heavily of that genre.’/Who knew it was a genre? I did not know!/I have been living in a
parallel universe where the word ‘lesbian’ is rarely a noun,/Certainly never plural/We wouldn’t
want to think there was more than one/It’s usually a modifier, leaning up against/something
larger and more ominous/Like a lifestyle, or an agenda, or a viewpoint./Actually if I had to
pick one of these three boxes/Carroll Merrill is standing in front of. /I think I’ll take the view-
point, yes,/I’d like the viewpoint for five hundred dollars/Because it comes with a lovely
mental image/I immediately imagine this family crossing the country in a minivan/And
maybe it’s Mom that sees the sign:/‘Lesbian viewpoint next left.’87
Hughes questions the use of the word ‘lesbian’: its endless mobility as an adjective, noun,
perspective, viewpoint or genre. She describes the convenience of this mobility to right-wing
rhetoric, within which Hughes’s sexual identity modifies the value of her performance art.
Quoting Jesse Helms on Andres Serrano, ‘he is not an artist,/he is a jerk’, Hughes shows
the New Right’s process of relabelling and recategorising that devalues the artist and their
work.88 Moving the identity category ‘lesbian’ into a box, Hughes purchases ‘the lesbian view-
point’ for five hundred dollars as if she were a contestant on a television game show. She
reveals that her sexual identity is not so easily contained, purchased or signposted. Nor is it
a tourist sight, a spectacle to glance at from the safety of the passing heterosexual. Hughes
queers time and space by foregrounding queer subjectivity, and presenting her audience with
a counter-discourse and counter-narrative to NEA v. Finley—a time and space in which she
was formerly constituted as morally deviant, indecent and reprehensible.
Hughes rewrites NEA vs. Finley giving herself the narrative agency that is markedly absent
not only in the oral arguments and proceedings of the case, but also media reportage of false
narratives describing her performances. She amalgamates media coverage of the Supreme
Court case and reviews of her performances, employing sustained theatrical metaphors
depicting the conventions and limitations of legal performance. Hughes also queers time
and space by employing intertextuality. Drawing on texts from the media, transcripts from
NEA v. Finley, hate mail and reviews of her own show, she resignifies these documents,
providing a counter-discourse to hegemonic constructions of queers as morally deviant
subjects. Drawing on a particularly American history of romantic individualism, she links
autobiographical details from her life, especially her childhood, paying attention to her
nuclear family, her class and race, linking these social structures with legal structures. She
also employs theatrical metaphors to describe court procedures. Instructed by her lawyer to
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purchase tickets for her own hearing because they are selling fast, Hughes buys two that she
might not use. When friends ask her for complimentary tickets, she explains that she does
not have any pull. Like the rest of the audience, she is seated on the pews while David Cole,
lawyer for the plaintiffs, argues their case. In the performance, Hughes voices her lack of
agency, comparing the Supreme Court to a sit-com:
I Explain:/There won’t be any witnesses. No Testimony./It’s a hearing not a trial/Each side
gets exactly half an hour to present their case./I think:/The Supreme Court is a situation
comedy. Think about it!/A stable of regulars face a zany new set of problems everyday/No
matter how complicated the situation/Everything gets worked out neatly in half an hour…89
Extending the impermeable temporal limitations of televisual culture to the Supreme Court,
Hughes cleverly characterises the hearing as a ludicrous comedy sketch. Even though the
case is a hearing, for Hughes ‘there’s a lot more arguing than hearing that goes on’.90 Hughes
explains that Cole ‘doesn’t get more than three words out/Before the Justices are all over him’,
redirecting Cole’s narrative to suit their own ends.91 Indeed the hearing is structured so that
those authorised to speak are proficient in the language of law and present an argument struc-
tured according to legal precedent. The constant interruption of Cole’s narrative privileges
the speech of the judge over the lawyer, with each interruption endorsing the superior/
inferior power dynamic. The only place in which Hughes’s argument is ‘heard’ is with the
audience at her performances of Preaching to the Perverted. Her own narrative style of inter-
rupting the disclosure of details from the case with autobiographical information mimics the
constant interruptions Cole experiences from the justices of the Supreme Court. Manipulating
the structure and language rhythms from the hearing, Hughes’s performance repositions and
reconceptualises marginalised sexual citizens, creating a counter-discourse to hegemonic
narratives that would otherwise have her silenced and erased. She explicitly invites her
audience to become her collaborators, forming a counterpublic committed to rewriting socio-
political and cultural scripts for those who occupy the margins:
This part of the script isn’t finished. My role in the Culture War is still very much a work
in progress, a story that I’m telling as I’m living it. But the point is it needs to be performed
in front of an audience. If I’m ever going to be able to write this wrong, I’ll need your help.92
This article demonstrates the serious consequences faced by American artists whose work
challenged and disrupted hegemonic discourses constituting the American citizen and
way of life. In the context of the culture wars, artists’ rights to free speech were mediated by
a culture of moral panic manufactured by the New Right around representations of gendered,
racialised and sexual subjects. However, simultaneously, artists and activists who challenged
this panicked environment and its subsequent regulations continued to critique notions of
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